

## Collaboration with the Apartheid regime

### Swiss National Science Foundation's NFP 42+ research programme presents scandalous results

«Through the development of a new legal basis the opportunity would, in principle, always have existed to create the foundation for an attitude which would have corresponded more strongly to human rights aspects and to the principles of international solidarity.»  
Georg Kreis (final report 2005)

The results of the Swiss National Science Foundation's NFP 42+ (SNSF) research programme on "Swiss-South African Relations" are shocking. Until the abolition of Apartheid in 1994, Swiss foreign and economic policy towards the Apartheid regime was characterised by understanding, collaboration and secret support. Simultaneously both the Swiss parliament, and the Swiss and international public, were repeatedly falsely and incorrectly informed, and incriminating behaviour which violated international law was covered up. Despite the scandalous results of the research on the Swiss governments' and administration's policy vis-à-vis South Africa, whose racist policies had been condemned as a crime against humanity, the Swiss government (Federal Council) announced – on the selfsame day in October 2005 that the final report was published by the president of the steering committee professor Georg Kreis – that even though it had taken cognisance of the research results, it would not be commenting upon them. A parliamentary motion, in contrast, is now [autumn 2005] demanding the establishment of a parliamentary commission of inquiry, and seven further parliamentary initiatives have been submitted. Extra-parliamentary pressure will have to continue to be applied in order for this important issue to remain on the political agenda and continue to be discussed.

The NFP 42+ research programme also came about as a result of outside pressure. In an introduction to his final report (Kreis 2005, page 23 ff.), Kreis sketches the story of how the research programme came to be. Critical questions concerning the export of war material and capital, the gold trade, the export risk guarantee, working conditions in Swiss companies, and on the uranium trade, have all repeatedly been raised since the 1970s – primarily by Anti-Apartheid Movement circles. Later information on military cooperation and in 1997 the secret service affair surrounding Swiss major general Peter Regli (concerning cooperation with Wouter Basson in a secret chemical warfare programme, amongst other things) reached the public. "For all these years those people who had posed these questions had to accept the answers given to them by the government or the authorities, even if they were unsatisfactory. Even 1997's revelations did not initially lead to serious efforts to clear matters up." (Kreis 2005, page 24). Not only was the will to clear matters up lacking, but Regli was, for example, ordered to tidy up his archives, and presumably destroyed important files in the process.<sup>1</sup>

Only after parallels to the Holocaust debate had been drawn in the media –in the Swiss weekly "Cash", for example, which said that "if the state and the banks do not react rapidly, then a debacle similar to the one of the Holocaust debate may well be repeated"<sup>2</sup> – and after a parliamentary motion had been submitted by Pia Hollenstein, a green party member of the Swiss parliament, calling for a critical review of the past with unrestricted access to the archives as was the case in the Holocaust issue, did a majority of the Swiss lower house of parliament decide on a "light" version of a national research programme and request the Swiss Federal Council to mandate the Swiss National Science Foundation's NFP 42+ research programme. In the autumn of 2001 ten research projects were launched,<sup>3</sup> the global grant for the research amounted to 2 million Swiss francs, whilst the SNSF had requested 4 million francs.

### **Censorship in the service of trade and industry**

Though all the research projects' results had to be submitted to the governmental departments concerned for checking before publication, the Swiss Federal Council had originally agreed to the liberal management of access to the official archives (with the exception of the intelligence services' archives) within the rule concerning the release of government documents after 30 years of protection. The Federal Council underlined this position in February 2002, saying that "the Swiss Federal Council is of the opinion that it is of central significance for the comprehensive and factually correct clarification of Swiss-South African relations that as broad a basis of sources be taken into account as possible." (Kreis 2005, page 40). Thus it was all the more surprising when the selfsame Swiss Federal Council decided to close access to the archives on 16 April 2003, and to alter the rule allowing for the public release of government documents after 30 years, extending it up to and including 1960 for documents containing information on the export of capital and on trade, or which included the names of companies (Bott et al., 2005, page 12).

The Switzerland–South Africa Research Group criticised the various censorship measures, saying that "the Swiss Federal Council has not kept its word. It has restricted research massively, and had the results censored. The aim of this censorship is to protect the big banks and companies, the Swiss central bank, the ministries for trade and industry and finance and not least the Swiss Federal Council itself from the publication of incriminating facts. Some explosive insights were only arrived at because the relevant documents were able to be scrutinised in South African archives."<sup>4</sup> The Swiss Federal Council had justified its closure of access to the archives with the court cases filed by victims of Apartheid in the USA in 2002. It said it wanted to prevent Swiss banks and enterprises from being disadvantaged. It was a rather threadbare argument, which could in addition backfire if the court cases are accepted in the USA, for any judge will surely interpret the Swiss Federal Council's position to mean that there may still be quite a few things in need of clarification. It appears even more questionable in the light of the fact that since July 2000 "an official administrative working group has met nine times so far with interested parties from trade and industry for

discussions on the issue of the class action lawsuits." (Kreis 2005, page 40). Kreis pointed out that the closure of access to the archives took place at an important moment for researchers, namely when they had "practically worked their way through to the more relevant papers." (ibid).

All these events lead one to the conclusion that there must have been intense lobbying against the NFP 42+ research programme by trade and industry right from the beginning. Their private archives remained closed, in any case, but the aim was to prevent important insights from the federal archives reaching the public. The Swiss Federal Council had given its support to these aims – as it had done so often with its South African policies.

Surprisingly enough, both Georg Kreis, the president of the steering committee, as well as the historian Peter Hug have distanced themselves from the charge of "censorship". According to their interpretation they entered into an agreement which they said they had to accept in order to be able to tackle the research projects at all – which would appear to be rather a strange argument from a science politics point of view. The underlying problem in this issue is that the people in charge at the SNSF did not oppose the measure decisively enough at the moment when access to the archives was denied.<sup>5</sup> Taking the freedom of research into consideration, they should not have accepted such an intervention under any circumstances. The SNSF's media release issued upon the conclusion of the NFP 42+ research programme leads one to suspect that its leadership was ideologically and politically in agreement with the Swiss Federal Council's line.<sup>6</sup> This leaves science plainly serving political interests.

### **Economics and politics scratch each others' backs**

The fact that the studies presented in October 2005 revealed new and explosive insights despite working in conditions made more difficult by censorship gives you an idea of how much would remain to be researched on relations between Switzerland and the Apartheid state if unimpeded access to the archives were possible – including the private ones.

This applies in particular to the study on economic relations (Bott et al., 2005).<sup>7</sup> On the basis of meticulous research, trade and financial relations from 1945 to 1968 are critically analysed on 250 pages. There are but 50 pages for the politically more important subsequent years through to 1990 – which is a result not least of the closure of access to the archives. The study nevertheless documents the dominance exercised by the big Swiss banks over policies vis-à-vis South Africa and provides new insights into the gold trade. It includes illuminating details on how keen the Swiss were on entering into business relations with South Africa after the Second World War. Over and above this the study shows how important it was to representatives of the Swiss economy and the authorities, to cover up these business deals from the international public. Statistics detailing certain gold transactions were eliminated from the Swiss customs statistics as early as 1951, in order to pre-empt criticism that Switzerland was avoiding adherence to the International Monetary Fund's regulations. At the

end of 1968 the Swiss ambassador in South Africa was instructed to apply to the governor of the South African Reserve Bank on account of the all-too-revealing item headed "Switzerland" in the Reserve Bank's statistics. The heading disappeared – and reappeared again after the end of Apartheid.

The ceiling for the export of capital to South Africa imposed by Switzerland is repeatedly cited to prove that economic relations with the Apartheid state were of a limited nature and subject to state control. The study proves that de facto the ceiling was done away with in the 1980s. The Swiss government's delegate for trade treaties, Franz Blankart, calmed the South African ambassador by informing him that the Swiss government had a degree of freedom in the management of the ceiling for the export of capital, "provided it is done discreetly and secretly." (Bott et al. 2005, page 276). In addition the authors emphasise how important personal relations between representatives of Swiss trade and industry, in particular the big Swiss banks, and representatives of the Apartheid regime, as well as the most important South African corporations, were.

Despite this important study, economic relations remain obscure in many areas. It is all the more important to shed more light on this in view of the fact that the representatives of trade and industry and the former friends of Apartheid incessantly spread the message that Swiss trade and industry supported democratic change in South Africa with its activities.<sup>8</sup> Two earlier studies had already dealt with the behaviour of Swiss big business in the Apartheid state (CETIM 1972; Roux 1990). They reached different conclusions. Roux summarises Swiss companies' attitudes in two basic points of view. Firstly, 'the purpose of our South African presence is to do good business'. And secondly, 'we have to adhere to the local laws'. Thus Swiss companies refused to take over international behavioural codices, and did not, in contrast with other international companies, make their voice heard against a new labour law in 1988, which was aimed at preventing black trade unions. The following episode is described as characteristic for Swiss companies by Roux. "When the US-American company General Motors bore the legal costs for a black worker who had been found guilty of using a 'white' beach, a Swiss manager was of the opinion that 'we could never do that. We have to adhere to the local laws'." (Roux 1990, page 91).

### **Violation of international law**

At the beginning of June 1990 Nelson Mandela paid an official visit to Switzerland. Four months had passed since the Apartheid regime had declared that it was prepared to release Mandela – who had been incarcerated for 27 years – and all the other political prisoners, and to open negotiations with the anti-Apartheid organisations which had been banned and brutally repressed up until then. On the occasion of his visit Mandela called upon the Swiss government to place sanctions on South Africa. The Swiss Federal Council rejected this approach out of principle.

Two months after Mandela's visit, however, Switzerland fully participated in international trade sanctions against Iraq. It suddenly became possible to embark on a course of action that had been declared to be in contravention of the principles of Swiss foreign policy for more than a decade, had been considered legally extremely problematic and had additionally been said to be politically counterproductive – without even one iota of any Swiss law or foreign policy dictum having changed!

This example, and others, can be found in the perceptive study presented by Jörg Künzli, an expert in international law (Künzli 2005).<sup>9</sup> He clearly illustrates that Switzerland's refusal to take diplomatic or economic action against the apartheid regime was not required for legal reasons, or reasons related to Switzerland's policy of neutrality, but were rather motivated purely by political interests.

The Swiss government did not feel bound either by the UN Security Council's only decision for sanctions against South Africa, the weapons embargo passed in 1977, which bound all UN members. The prohibition of the export of weapons, which applied in Switzerland for exports to South Africa on account of the Swiss war material laws, contained substantial gaps in comparison with the UN regulations, primarily concerning the issues of nuclear and technical cooperation, and weapons licences. When questioned in parliament, the Swiss Federal Council repeatedly referred to the Swiss prohibition of the export of weapons. It gave the impression that Switzerland was adhering to the UN weapons embargo, because there was the prohibition of the export of weapons to South Africa on the basis of the war material laws. Vis-à-vis the UN, however, Switzerland invoked the fact that it was not a member of the UN to justify why it was not adhering to the UN weapons embargo.

The Swiss government sometimes even found itself in the grey areas close to violation of its own neutrality and of international law for the benefit of good relations with the Apartheid regime. The conclusion that can be drawn from the Künzli study is that if Swiss diplomacy ever took any risks, showed independence and risked international condemnation, then it did so only in the interests of the Apartheid regime.

### **Military cooperation, intelligence services and a forgotten war**

The Swiss media's attention focussed mainly on Peter Hug's study on military and intelligence service cooperation between Switzerland and South Africa.<sup>10</sup> This is hardly surprising in view of the explosiveness of the subject. "On a political and armed forces level, and concerning the weapons industry, Switzerland's relations with South Africa were at their most intense in those years when enforcement of the South African policy of racial segregation (Apartheid) was accompanied most intensely by serious human rights violations and open use of force, that is to say in the 1980s. Swiss industry extensively avoided the weapons embargo which the UN had imposed on South Africa. It even violated the rules Switzerland had laid down itself concerning the export of weapons, even though they were far less restrictive than those of the UN. The federal authorities were informed about many

illegal and semi-legal deals. They silently tolerated them, partially even supported them actively or only criticised them half-heartedly. The Swiss Federal Council was not informed of most of the details and hardly took its role as the supreme national political body seriously. This also applies to intelligence service cooperation. The exchange of intelligence service information between Switzerland and the Apartheid state started five years earlier than was previously known, and contributed directly to the preparation of weapons deals, the battle against opponents of Apartheid and to political propaganda in favour of the South African government. Swiss industry was also one of the pillars of the secret South African atomic weapons programme. The companies Gebrüder Sulzer AG and VAT Haag delivered important components for South African uranium enrichment, which provided the fissile material required for the six atomic bombs manufactured by South Africa." (Hug 2005, page 1)

Hug also addresses cooperation between the Swiss secret service and the South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS), which was intensified from 1965 onwards. "The Bureau of State Security's "Z Squad" division carried out one of the first extra-judicial executions of a black opposition leader, ordered by the South African government, from Switzerland in 1974." (ibid., page 6). The South African secret service later praised its contacts with right-wing political circles in Switzerland. "As is illustrated by South African military intelligence service papers, it attached great significance to contacts with people such as Zurich's 'subversives hunter' Ernst Cincera, the head of Switzerland's institute for studies of the east (Schweizerisches Ostinstitut) Peter Sager, and the president of the Southern Africa working group (Arbeitsgruppe südliches Afrika) Christoph Blocher." (ibid., page 10). Their interest was framed by the South African Comops project (propaganda to improve the Apartheid state's image and to spy on opponents of Apartheid). Swiss citizens and organisations who opposed Apartheid are mentioned by name in South African secret service documents – the work of the spy "Derick".

Not all the studies are as accurately researched as the three studies mentioned above. Sometimes blatant mistakes can be found. In the Vatter study<sup>11</sup> for example you will find the statement that "at no point in time of the period under investigation (1985-1994) was South Africa in a state of war with another state." (Vatter 2005, page 256). But as early as August 1975, even before Angolan independence, South African troops pushed into Angolan territory in order to support Jonas Savimbi's Unita. The armed conflict with the liberation movement MPLA, which was supported by Cuba, became the biggest war in the world at the time, when it spread to the siege of the city of Cuito Cuanavale in June 1987 – that is to say in the middle of the period under investigation in Vatter's study.

### **The international context is missing – "who was who"?**

These deficiencies are a result of not questioning the position of the Swiss government at the time, which did not consider the Swiss policy of neutrality to be violated by bilateral relations with South Africa on account of this 'non-existent war',<sup>12</sup> and of not paying adequate attention

to the international context. In this case the researchers simply assumed the official point of view of the Swiss Federal Council.

Basically, the international context was hardly included in the NFP 42+ research programme – even though this was part of the mandate. Contrary to the demands stipulated by the person originally foreseen for the role of head of the programme, no international advisory council was envisaged for the project,<sup>13</sup> and South African researchers were also not included. In addition those sources that are available, such as leading foreign economics newspapers or Anti-Apartheid Movement archives, were only consulted in a few studies. Debates in the UN, the Commonwealth and the Non-Aligned Movement are equally absent from the research – except in the case of Hug's, Künzli's and Barbara Müller's studies. The biased view, concentrating excessively on Switzerland, occasionally degenerates into navel-gazing.

The "who was who" has yet to be written. Besides the role of current Swiss federal councillor (minister) Blocher, who worked together with the Apartheid state politically and industrially, as president of the Southern Africa working group (Arbeitsgruppe südliches Afrika) and with his company EMS-Patvag, more light also needs to be shed on the role of former economics consultant and current Swiss federal councillor Hans-Rudolf Merz, who was closely associated with the Schmidheiny corporation (Eternit/Everite). It is conspicuous that the undisputedly central role of state secretary Edouard Brunner does not receive the space due to it in the final report – he defined Swiss foreign policy in the second half of the 1980s, after all, until he was despatched to Washington at the beginning of 1989. Vatter says that "la stratégie c'était Brunner" (Vatter 2005, page 157) and that "for Brunner, the cold war represented a core problem, and the greatest danger to Western democracies. His foreign policy was correspondingly oriented towards preventing the danger of the expansion of communism." (ibid., page 167). Equally, the final report does not make it adequately clear how dominant the role played by the federal ministry for trade and industry was (the Swiss Bundesamt für Wirtschaft Bawi, now called Seco). Both Kreis and Künzli emphasised the trade and industry ministry's dominant influence on South Africa policy on the occasion of a panel discussion.

### **Political instrumentalisation of the sanctions issue**

"The fact that Switzerland stood apart when it came to international sanctions against South Africa lent support to the Apartheid regime, but did not lead to it staying in power longer." This introductory sentence in the SNSF's media release is not tenable. It cannot be concluded in this way from the studies presented in the framework of the NFP 42+ research programme. The statement is scandalous, however, because it makes it clear how the results of the NFP 42+ research programme are used for political ends.

Kreis is not consistent on this issue in his final report either. Whilst his case differentiates the various strands of the sanctions debate in the reports section, and he repeatedly refers to the

various studies and the work of Mascha Madörin (2005) on the international sanctions debate, in his closing remarks<sup>14</sup> he arrives at the conclusion that "the fact that Switzerland did not join the sanctions movement supported and strengthened and thus abetted the Apartheid state on the level of economic efficiency, with all its loan hungry state-run companies and its high state expenditure, in particular on account of the export of capital and the reduction of South African gold exports. This was, however, hardly of great significance for the life span of the regime." (Kreis 2005, page 496).

This daring interpretation, that aiding the system did not lead to its prolongation, is based on the Hefti/Staehelin-Witt study (2005).<sup>15</sup> The primary task of this study, which, on the basis of scientific criteria, is also extremely questionable, is obviously to prove the non-prolongation thesis and thus primarily to exonerate the large Swiss banks. Hefti/Staehelin-Witt concluded that the state-level financial sanctions, which commenced on a grand scale in 1985, hardly caused South Africa any additional economic costs, and that they were insignificant in relation to South African political change. But now there is new data available, in particular from the South African Reserve Bank, which gives a completely different picture, namely that South Africa was in a permanent balance of payments crisis until the onset of democracy, on account of the state-level financial sanctions. In a recent public announcement Tito Mboweni, governor of the South African Reserve Bank, made the following remark concerning the period under scrutiny. "The type of crisis that was experienced in 1997 and 1998 in Asia was in fact experienced by South Africa in the mid-eighties at the time of the debt standstill, albeit for different reasons. As a result of the government's Apartheid policies, the country had no access to the international capital markets at the time, including no access to borrowing from the IMF or official agencies."<sup>16</sup>

Even clearer comments were made by the South African Reserve Bank in its submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.<sup>17</sup> It apologised humbly and above all diplomatically, in case its macro-economic stabilisation policies had contributed to the necessary political reforms being delayed, by saying that "the persistent deficit in the overall balance of payments had a depressing effect on economic growth and development. [...] The macroeconomic consequences of the political system of the time made the apartheid policies of the government untenable. [...] The Reserve Bank always regarded its actions and behaviour to be strictly in compliance with its mandate given to it by parliament, and that is to maintain overall financial stability, even in an adverse political environment. To the extent that its macro-economic monetary policies with this overriding impartial objective in mind delayed the process of political reforms in South Africa, or did not more actively contribute to an earlier enforcement of the inevitable process of change, the bank joins other institutions that already submitted their humble apologies to this Commission, and to all the people of South Africa."

For the South African Reserve Bank the large Swiss banks were important partners, in relation to both the debt rescheduling negotiations as well as the stabilising currency transactions. The issue of financial stabilisation by the South African Reserve Bank and the

role of the large Swiss banks is not addressed in the Hefti/Staehelin-Witt study.

The question of whether Switzerland's standing apart lengthened the life of the regime is not the only one that needs addressing in the sanctions issue. Those states which imposed sanctions did so with clear political demands directed at the Apartheid regime, namely the abolition of Apartheid laws, an end to the state of emergency, unconditional release of all political prisoners, repeal of the banning of the ANC and other political groups, the opening of negotiations – with the aim of creating a non-racist, democratic government. Switzerland not only rejected sanctions, but with them also largely rejected the negotiation conditions and political demands linked to sanctions (Madörin 2005, page 70 ff.).

Leading Swiss foreign policy makers publicly threw their weight behind group rights – special rights for the whites. Thus in 1988, for example, state secretary Edouard Brunner, "explained to South African bishop Patrick Mvemve that the principle of 'one man – one vote' had not yet been realised in Switzerland, which is why it was not necessary for South Africa to introduce this principle either. In Switzerland 'one man – one vote' did not apply, because every Swiss canton (state) had two seats in the Swiss upper house of parliament, irrespective of whether it was large or small. 'That is why we should also aim for a democratic system in South Africa in which the voice of one population group is given more weight than the voice of the rest of the population'." (Kreis 2005, page 219). The "Club of Friends of Africa" went even further. In one of its South Africa letters (1980) it voiced the opinion that "the black man does not respect anything but force. When in doubt he obeys the most powerful." (ibid, page 132).

### **The final chapter has yet to be written**

The NFP 42+ research programme has provided the public with important new insights which have shown that official Swiss policy and trade and industry collaborated more closely and more systematically with the Apartheid state than the Anti-Apartheid Movement and other critics have postulated up until now. A broad political and scientific debate has now to be conducted on the results of this research. Researchers from South Africa and other countries, as well as people involved, have to be included therein. The NFP 42+ research programme only represents an interim result.

Swiss trade and industry's relations with the Apartheid regime require further research. The gaps in the research concerning the 1970s and above all the 1980s remain substantial. Three areas need analysing in depth.

Firstly: Swiss policy is considered a battle against the expansion of communism and is thus analysed exclusively from the point of view of the East-West conflict in the NFP 42+ research programme. The de-colonisation aspect, and the black population's liberation struggle in the context of the Non-Aligned Movement NAM and of the Commonwealth are thus completely ignored.

Secondly: The racist aspect of white supremacy, the whites' ideology of superiority and the sympathy extended to this ideology in Switzerland should also be analysed in more detail. That is to say white leadership forming the basis for political and economic action needs analysing.

Thirdly: The point of view of the victims has to decidedly be included in the research too, as was the case in the Holocaust investigations. (Madörin 2005a, page 127 ff.) "All in all, no questions were posed of Switzerland and in Switzerland on the Apartheid past by South Africans." (Kreis 2005, page 37). This statement is based on a one-sided perspective. If it applies to the government's position, then it is true. From the point of view of the victims of Apartheid, it adds a further personal insult to injury. Their organisation Khulumani<sup>18</sup> and the campaign Jubilee South Africa<sup>19</sup> have repeatedly called upon governments, banks and business to present their Apartheid past to the public. Representatives from these organisations have visited Switzerland several times, but have not been met by a great deal of attention.

People in South Africa who have suffered at the hands of the Apartheid regime do not only have the right to discover the truth, they also have the right to reparations. Truth + reparations + amnesty = reconciliation, is their convincing slogan.

\* The Switzerland–South Africa Research Group – coordinated by the Swiss NGO Solifonds – has been investigating various aspects of Swiss political and economic collaboration with the Apartheid state for five years, and works towards a systematic scientific investigation of Swiss-South African relations. Various studies have been published in the «Apartheid-Connections» series, more are due to follow.

See [www.apartheid-reparations.ch](http://www.apartheid-reparations.ch) for information and comments on the Swiss National Science Foundation's NFP 42+ research programme.

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## Footnotes

<sup>1</sup> The fact that files were destroyed was established by a sub-committee of the Swiss parliament's parliamentary commission of inquiry in 1999. After an administrative investigation by the Swiss defence department against Regli, the state attorney has been investigating the charge of destroying files since 2003.

<sup>2</sup> See "Cash" of 9 November 2001.

<sup>3</sup> The list of research projects, short summaries and the bibliographical information for those projects which have already been published can be found on the Swiss National Science Foundation's website under [www.snf.ch/de/rep/nat/nat\\_nrp\\_42p.asp](http://www.snf.ch/de/rep/nat/nat_nrp_42p.asp). The Switzerland–

South Africa Research Group's comments on the individual studies have been published [in German] on the website [www.apartheid-reparations.ch](http://www.apartheid-reparations.ch).

<sup>4</sup> These can be found at [www.apartheid-reparations.ch](http://www.apartheid-reparations.ch).

<sup>5</sup> The Swiss history society (Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Geschichte SGG) vehemently criticised the Swiss Federal Council's decision in two letters of protest dated 1 May and 30 June 2003, and demanded the reversal of the extension of the so-called 30-year rule as their minimal demand. The Swiss National Science Foundation, in contrast, only expressed its regret over the restrictions placed on the freedom of research to the Swiss Federal Council.

<sup>6</sup> The introductory sentence of the media release on the sanctions is tendentious and untenable from a scientific point of view. See the comments on the sanctions in the remainder of this article, as well as Madörin (2005).

<sup>7</sup> See [www.apartheid-reparations.ch](http://www.apartheid-reparations.ch) for a detailed comment by Mascha Madörin.

<sup>8</sup> A part of the Swiss media repeatedly supported the spreading of these untenable claims. Two programmes, for example, allowed a friend of Apartheid, Swiss people's party (SVP) member of parliament Ulrich Schlüer, to spread this claim unchallenged in his partial comment on the results of the NFP 42+ research programme. (The programmes in question were Swiss national radio DRS's programme "Samstagsrundschau" on 29 October 2005 and Swiss national television SFDRS's programme "Politische Rundschau" on 2 November 2005.)

<sup>9</sup> See [www.apartheid-reparations.ch](http://www.apartheid-reparations.ch) for an extensive comment by Mascha Madörin.

<sup>10</sup> A detailed discussion of this important study is unfortunately not yet possible, even though it was completed in 2004, as it had to be presented for intense scrutiny to five ministries and also to those companies named in the study. It was kept under wraps until the media conference held on the 27 October 2005. Publication is planned for 2006.

<sup>11</sup> See [www.apartheid-reparations.ch](http://www.apartheid-reparations.ch) for detailed criticism by Martina Egli.

<sup>12</sup> Jörg Künzli arrives at a contrary assessment on this question (Künzli 2005, page 355). He does not consider this interpretation to be tenable in the face of years of armed conflict.

<sup>13</sup> Professor Gabriel of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zürich), who had originally been foreseen for the role of head of the programme, did not accept because an international advisory council was not approved, amongst other things.

<sup>14</sup> This is so important because with such voluminous works, it is the summary and the closing remarks that are read and reproduced by the media.

<sup>15</sup> See [www.apartheid-reparations.ch](http://www.apartheid-reparations.ch) for detailed criticism by Mascha Madörin.

<sup>16</sup> Statement made on 1 March 2004, see [www.reservebank.co.za](http://www.reservebank.co.za), the South African Reserve Bank's website.

<sup>17</sup> 13 November 1997, see [www.reservebank.co.za](http://www.reservebank.co.za)

<sup>18</sup> [www.khulumani.net](http://www.khulumani.net)

<sup>19</sup> [www.jubileesa.org.za](http://www.jubileesa.org.za)

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